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This paper attempts to supplement a literature concerned with Turkey‘s 
Ottoman legacy, especially as it pertains to the functioning of civil society in 
Turkey.  It does so because the efficacy of civil society in Turkey is a major topic of 
discussion in light of its European Union accession bid, and Turkey‘s Ottoman 
legacy is yet to be comprehensively teased out.  While the strong state tradition 
which is part of the Ottoman legacy is well documented, relations within society 
separate from the state‘s influence are yet to be subjected to an historical analysis.  
While the influence of the state on Turkish society is pervasive, and must be a 
component of any analysis of civil society in Turkey, analysis focusing on Turkey‘s 
strong state legacy has obscured other interesting facets of the country‘s Ottoman 
legacy.  This paper posits that deficiencies in Turkish civil society are not just the 
result of the strong state tradition, but also reflect social attitudes that can be traced 
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Introduction 
 This paper attempts to supplement a literature concerned with Turkey‘s 
Ottoman legacy, especially as it pertains to the functioning of civil society in 
Turkey.  It does so because the efficacy of civil society in Turkey is a major topic of 
discussion in light of its European Union (EU) accession bid, and Turkey‘s Ottoman 
legacy is yet to be comprehensively teased out.  While the strong state tradition 
which is part of the Ottoman legacy is well documented, relations within society 
separate from the state‘s influence are yet to be subjected to an historical analysis.  
While the influence of the state on Turkish society is pervasive, and must be a 
component of any analysis of civil society in Turkey, analysis focusing on Turkey‘s 
strong state legacy has obscured other interesting facets of the country‘s Ottoman 
legacy.  This paper posits that deficiencies in Turkish civil society are not just the 
result of the strong state tradition, but also reflect social attitudes that can be traced 
to a number of policies implemented in the late-Ottoman Empire.  The paper thus 
seeks to answer the following question: Can deficient horizontal relations in Turkish 
civil society, evident in a lack of trust, tolerance, and respect for minority issues, be 
linked to the state‘s Ottoman legacy? 
 The paper proceeds as follows: The first chapter discusses contemporary 
Turkish civil society.  It discusses the need for Turkey‘s civil society to 
‗qualitatively‘ improve for the progress to be made in Turkey‘s EU candidacy, and 
identifies the paper‘s focus on the issue of minority and cultural rights.  It argues that 
the procedural difficulties Turkey evidences are compounded by qualitative 
deficiencies which overarch a number of examples of Turkey‘s inability to secure 
minority and cultural rights.  The qualitative short-comings of Turkish society, 
which are usually attributed to the Ottoman legacy of a strong state tradition which 
inhibits civil society, are also linked to horizontal relations which are not necessarily 
the result of the strong state tradition.  A distinction between vertical and horizontal 
relations is made to more fully appreciate the obstacles to democratic consolidation 
as indicated by the fostering of an effective civil society. 
 The second chapter discusses the structural benefits of civil society, and what 
is required to achieve them.  It is pointed out that effective horizontal networks are 
concomitant with secondary structures, that is, autonomous public spheres 
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independent of state influence.  Furthermore, their structural aspect is identified as 
being the result of an economic legacy.  In time, theses spheres exercised influence 
over the state and institutionalized a broader public space where economic freedoms 
were extended to include civil rights.  This indicates the cultural nature of civil 
society, notably the fact that its emergence represented the shattering of traditional 
and personal ties of allegiance.  It is also noted that this notion of civil society did 
not emerge in the Ottoman Empire.  Instead of a shattering of personal ties of 
allegiance, patrimonial relations persisted.  Without this ‗shattering,‘ the Ottoman 
Empire remained mired in a societal system based on particularistic allegiances 
which have only recently begun to be challenged. 
 The third chapter comprises a literature review of Turkey‘s Ottoman legacy.  
It is noted that this is generally restricted to an analysis of Turkey‘s strong state 
tradition, to the detriment of an investigation of relations which persist in some 
respects independent of this tradition. 
The fourth chapter provides an analysis of reform policies enacted during the 
late Ottoman Empire.  The chapter begins with the Tanzimat reforms enacted in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.  Specifically, it highlights how certain of these 
reforms resulted in the further codification of the Ottoman millet system.  The millet 
system is thus discussed, and what its further systematization meant.  Noting that 
this occurred during a time of increasing tensions between religious communities, it 
is posited that these reforms may have institutionalized a break-down of trust in 
Ottoman society that was occurring as inter-communal relations deteriorated.  
Following this, further significant reforms and policies up until the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic are analysed.  It is posited that these reforms exacerbated the 
distrust of others, especially of non-Muslims by Muslims, and later non-Turks, by 
Turks.  In the conclusion it is argued that these developments during the late-
Ottoman period may provide an insight into the persistence of deficient horizontal 




6 | P a g e  
 
Chapter One: Political Liberalization and Civil Society in Turkey 
 Turkey applied for associate membership in the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1959 and signed the ‗Ankara Agreement,‘ which recognized 
Turkey as an associate member, in 1963.  This began the process of establishing a 
customs union between the two actors and, ultimately, of granting Turkish 
membership in the EEC, later the European Union (EU).  In 1987, Turkey applied 
for full EEC membership, with a customs union finally being established in 1995.  
Following this, in 1997, Turkey was declared eligible to become an EU member, in 
1999 was declared a candidate country for EU membership, and in 2001 the 
Luxembourg Council adopted the ‗Accession Partnership‘ for Turkey.  In 2004, the 
Luxembourg Council defined the conditions for opening accession negotiations, and 
in 2005 a negotiating framework was adopted and negotiations formally opened.  
These negotiations were facilitated by a ‗screening process‘ which determined to 
what degree Turkey met the membership criteria, and thus what criteria the country 
was still required to fulfil.
1
 
 A significant component of the criteria against which Turkey is evaluated is 
the Copenhagen Criteria, according to which; 
―Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the 
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on 
the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union.‖2 
 
The political obligations of the Copenhagen Criteria sum up a desired project of 
political liberalization of Turkish society, in that they ―serve to improve human 
rights and democracy, establish the rule of law and develop several initiatives, which 
in the end create a suitable domestic and international environment for minority 
rights.‖3  So far Turkey is deemed by the EU to have been unsuccessful.  The 2012 
                                                          
1
 European Commission, "Enlargement; Countries; Detailed Country Information: Turkey,"  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm. 
2
 Copenhagen European Council, "Presidency Conclusions," (1993). 
3
 Sule Toktas and Bulent Aras, "The Eu and Minority Rights in Turkey," Political Science Quarterly 
124, no. 4 (2009). p706. 
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Progress Report on Turkey‘s accession bid points out that while progress has been 
made in some areas, significant issues remain.  Central to EU concerns is the claim 
that ―[t]here has been very limited progress as regards fundamental rights,‖4 which is 
significant because ―[t]he EU defines the protection of minority rights as a moral 
condition for membership.‖5  In particular, the report points to: 
 the lack of an independent Ombudsman institution 
 continued police impunity 
 insufficient access to justice 
 increase in violations of freedom of expression 
 insufficient progress made on the freedom of assembly and association 
 insufficient progress made on the freedom of thought conscience and 
religion 
 a need for legislation concerning women‘s rights and gender equality to be 
implemented more effectively 
 a need for overall improvement in children‘s rights  
 insufficient progress made on the issue of the socially vulnerable and/or 
persons with disabilities 
 no progress made on anti-discrimination policies 




In conclusion, the report states that ―[t]he situation regarding the respect for 
fundamental rights continues to be the source of serious preoccupation, notably 
stemming from the wide application of the legal framework on terrorism and 
organised crime, which leads to recurring infringement on the right to liberty and 
security, of the right to a fair trial and the freedom of expression, assembly and 
association.‖7  Furthermore, Turkey is yet to sign the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities.  Instead, it ―responds with claims that it is a 
unitary republic and does not have a minority question‖ and that ―the Treaty of 
Lausanne provide[s] protection and equal treatment of non-Muslim minorities, 
which also allegedly satisfies the Copenhagen criteria.‖8 
 The procedural difficulty that Turkey is experiencing with political 
liberalization according to European norms is concomitant with more substantive 
short-comings in Turkish society.  In the literature concerning contemporary Turkish 
                                                          
4
 Commission Staff, "Turkey 2012 Progress Report," (European Commission, 2012). p72. 
5
 Toktas and Aras, "The Eu and Minority Rights in Turkey." pp705-706. 
6
 Staff, "Turkey 2012 Progress Report." pp70-75. 
7
 Ibid. pp74-75. 
8
 Toktas and Aras, "The Eu and Minority Rights in Turkey." p708. 
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societal relations, it is often noted that Turkish civil society lacks in certain crucial 
respects.  For example, Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel argue that Turkish 
society is fundamentally weak,
9
 and Kalaycioğlu argues that ―civil society in Turkey 
is highly fragmented, lacks patterns of cooperation and has no active membership 
basis due to the low public tendency to become part of associational life.‖10  Poulton 
states that ―freedom of expression in Turkey, the basic precondition for democracy, 
remains severely curtailed.‖11  These are perhaps surprising statements, considering 
the literature also often refers to the significant growth in Turkish civil society since 
a closer relationship with the EU was established in the 1990s.  These seemingly 
contradictory positions can, however, be resolved by an analysis of the qualitative 
nature of civil society.  Thus Şimşek argues that civil society is more than the mere 
existence of so-called ‗civil society organizations‘ (CSO) and instead requires the 
existence of ‗civility‘ which ―implies tolerance, the willingness of individuals to 
accept disparate political views and social attitudes; to accept the profoundly 
important idea that there is no right answer.‖12  Similarly, Heper and Yildirim state 
that the primary characteristics of civil society are pluralism, altruism, toleration, 
and civility.
13
  Applying criterion derived from this perspective to Turkey, Şimşek 
goes on to argue that Turkish civil society ―still has significant shortcomings‖ and 
―is still very far from contributing to democratization.‖14 Özler and Sarkissian 
reinforce this argument and claim that civil society is underdeveloped and unable to 
contribute positively to the democratization process because civil society 
organizations ―have developed along a polarized Islamist-secularized divide.‖15  
 Different issue areas can be used as lenses through which the shortcomings of 
Turkish civil society can be analyzed.  Through a cultural prism, one can analyze the 
                                                          
9
 In P. Kubicek, "The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey," Turkish Studies 6, 
no. 3 (2005). p373.  See also Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, "Costs, 
Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of Eu Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and 
Turkey," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 41, no. 3 (2003). 
10
 In A. Ergun, "Civil Society in Turkey and Local Dimensions of Europeanization," European 
Integration 32, no. 5 (2010). p510. See also Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity 
or Change?," (2002).  
11
 Hugh Poulton, "The Turkish State and Democracy," The International Spectator 34, no. 1 (1999). 
p62. 
12
 S. Şimşek, "The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality," Turkish 
Studies 5, no. 3 (2004). p53. 
13
 Metin Heper and Senem Yıldırım, "Revisiting Civil Society in Turkey," Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies 11, no. 1 (2011). pp4-6. 
14
 Şimşek, "The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality." p68. 
15
 Ş İlgü Özler and Ani Sarkissian, "Stalemate and Stagnation in Turkish Democratization: The Role 
of Civil Society and Political Parties," Journal of Civil Society 7, no. 4 (2011). p378. 
9 | P a g e  
 
political situation of Kurds living in Turkey.  From a religious perspective, one can 
analyze the situation of non-Sunni Muslims, notably the Alevi, as well as the 
position of non-Muslim minorities, namely Jews, Armenians, and Greeks.  While 
these examples have their own particular concerns, the same deficiencies in Turkish 
civil society can be attributed to their persistence.  Hence Ergil states that  
―[t]he Kurdish problem is but one symptom of a more general 
weakness of Turkish democracy.  Although the plight of the Kurds 
[tends] to receive the greatest international attention, other groups 
outside the official mainstream of Turkish society – Islamic 
activists, ethnic and cultural minority groups, and intellectuals on 
both the left and the right – have all, at one time or another, been 
silenced by the Turkish state.‖16 
 
 The Kurdish question in Turkey is especially significant because it is a 
prominent reason that Turkey‘s integration into the EU is impeded.  Yavuz calls 
them ―a litmus test for democracy and human rights in Turkey.‖17  The inability of 
the Turkish state to accommodate its Kurdish citizens‘ demands for cultural 
recognition, for example by inhibiting the teaching of Kurdish in schools and the 
broadcasting of Kurdish television and radio programs, is used as an example by the 
EU as evidence of human rights abuses.
18
  While legal prohibitions were removed in 
the 1990s, restrictions remain in place, and efforts to practice these rights often face 
official censure and pressure.
19
  Historically, the existence of the Kurds in Turkey 
has been denied by the state, a policy which persists, if not as intently: ―There are a 
number of right-wing academics and intellectuals who continue to try to prove that 
the Kurdish people and their identity are no different from the Turkish people and 
culture.‖20  Such denial is also evidenced by the fact that the Kurds continue to be 
denied minority status in the Turkish political system because Turkish Kurds are 
                                                          
16
 Doğu Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey," Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (2000). p123. 
17
 M Hakan Yavuz, "A Preamble to the Kurdish Question: The Politics of Kurdish Identity," Journal 
of Muslim Minority Affairs 18, no. 1 (1998). p16. 
18
 Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey." pp122-123. 
19
 Poulton, "The Turkish State and Democracy." pp52-53. 
20
 ―The view behind this policy was that the Kurds were of Turkish Origin but during the course of 
unexpected historical events such as migrations, wars and draughts they had to live under the 
influence of foreign powers, and thus had become self-alienated.  What the Turkish government had 
to do was to teach them what they had forgotten about themselves.‖ Sefa Şimşek, "New Social 
Movements in Turkey since 1980," Turkish Studies 5, no. 2 (2004). p131. 
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predominantly Sunni Muslim.  Because of this, Kurds are effectively marginalized 
or subjected to assimilation.
21
 
 Poulton states that ―[a]ssimilation is deliberately used to overcome ethnic 
differences‖ through a process of benign neglect, which refers to the state‘s policy of 
allowing Kurds to exist, but restricts their access to mainstream society unless they 
―[abandon] their own culture and [adopt] the state approved Turkish model.‖22  Such 
a process is designed to ―lead to assimilation over usually two to three generations, 
as without help the minority culture is clearly at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
dominant culture.‖23  Such a strategy is significant because it relies upon the 
collusion of civil society. 
 A significant manner in which Kurdish cultural identity is restricted is through 
the prohibition of certain letters which exist in the Kurdish alphabet, but not in the 
Turkish.  Further, restrictions on the expression of Kurdish identity in the public 
realm extend to the prohibition of political parties which advocate for Kurdish 
issues.  Along with parties which openly advocate for political Islam or radical left-
wing views, Kurdish political parties ―face censure for being unconstitutional.‖24  
Ultimately, Taktas and Aras argue that reforms undertaken by Turkey to satisfy the 
Copenhagen criteria are purposefully aimed at the bare minimum and that ―[t]here is 
still a gap between de facto and de jure minority issues.‖25  Rights for Kurds and 
other minorities which are supposedly ensured by reforms are complicated by a lack 
of implementation or the placement of barriers to their enjoyment. 
Even following amendments to the Turkish Constitution in1995 ―some basic 
principles which clearly infringe the right to non-violent freedom of expression 
remain, as well as others which have been used as the basis for repressing free 
expression.‖26  Concerning civil society attitudes towards the Kurdish situation, ―the 
rigid attitude of the military and the violent attacks of the PKK [Kurdistan Workers‘ 
Party][have in the past] scared many people in Turkey.  Thus, efforts to begin an 
                                                          
21
 For a discussion on the economic marginalization of Kurds, see Paul J White, "Economic 
Marginalization of Turkey's Kurds: The Failed Promise of Modernization and Reform," Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs 18, no. 1 (1998). 
22
 Poulton, "The Turkish State and Democracy." p48. 
23
 Ibid. p49. 
24
 Ibid. p54. 
25
 Toktas and Aras, "The Eu and Minority Rights in Turkey." p713. 
26
 Poulton, "The Turkish State and Democracy." p56. 
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open discussion of the Kurdish problem failed each time.‖27  Only since 1999 and 
Turkey‘s EU candidacy have more people began to sympathize with the Kurdish 
movement in Turkey,
28
 however as explained later, this does not necessarily reflect a 
qualitative change in civil society. 
 The sphere of religious freedom in Turkey is also significant as ―[r]eligious 
freedom in Turkey will be one of the most important issues covered during Turkey‘s 
membership negotiations with the EU.‖29  Concerning religious identities, the 
qualitative short-comings of Turkish civil society can be seen with the treatment of 
non-majority Muslims such as the Alevi, and non-Muslim communities.  This is 
especially evident considering that limited political liberalization, which has 
occurred since the 1990s, has allowed civil society organizations to operate only for 
the official state religion of Sunni Islam.  All other religious activity is banned from 
the public sphere.  This one-sided increase in civil society activity has not improved 
the quality of civil society in Turkey.  Religious civil society activity focuses almost 
solely on the Sunni majority, thus further marginalizing minority religious groups.  
The Alevi are particularly affected by this state of affairs.  Sunni dominance in the 
public sphere, as well as its intimate affiliation with the state,  coupled with a 
generally assimilative Sunni approach to Alevis negatively affects their ability to 
contribute to democratization.
30
  In particular, the socialization of Alevi youth 
through ―mandatory instruction of Sunni Islam in state schools‖ and the socialization 
of the Alevi in general through practices such as the state-funded construction of 
mosques in Alevi villages,
31
 when not successful creates strong reactions which do 
not facilitate open dialogue. 
As well as non-majority Muslims, Turkey‘s minority regime established by 
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 officially recognizes Armenians, Greeks and Jews, 
and legislates for the ―right to use their own language, the right of political and civic 
equality, the right to establish religious, educational, and social welfare institutions, 
                                                          
27




 Toktas and Aras, "The Eu and Minority Rights in Turkey." p714. 
30
 re Erman and Emrah Göker, "Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey," Middle Eastern 
Studies 36, no. 4 (2000). 
31
 Grigoriadis, "Islam and Democratization in Turkey: Secularism and Trust in a Divided Society." 
p1197. 
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and the right to freedom of religion, travel, and migration.‖32  This includes 
broadcasting and publishing rights.  However, Toktas and Aras point out that this 
regime ―has been violated continuously by domestic political maneuvers [sic] and 
measures operating within the pretext of country-specific conditions.‖33  Aksan 
reinforces this claim when she states that ―present-day Turks will have difficulty 
allowing that an Orthodox Greek living in Turkey is somehow a Turkish citizen.  
Armenians and Jews are similarly viewed with suspicion.‖34 
The above are all examples of a need and desire for further and more 
substantive political liberalization in Turkish society.  While Kanra argued in 2005 
that ―there appears to be considerable scope to broaden the horizon of Turkey‘s 
long-running aspiration towards democratization and towards the reconciliation of 
Islam and democracy,‖35 Grigoriadis points out that since 2007, ―[a]midst rising 
social tension, mutual distrust has aggravated relations between secularists and 
conservatives.‖36  Since that date, successive political crises concerning the 
secularist nature of the regime have resulted in Turkish societal divisions 
manifesting as large protests.  Grigoriadis argues that the core element of these 
divisions is a ―lack of respect for individual autonomy ... [which pervades] the whole 
of Turkish society.‖37  In 2012, Mousseau states that although reform progress has 
been made in the economic sphere and with reference to fundamental rights 
concerning physical integrity and protection from torture and political imprisonment, 
fundamental rights concerning ―political, civil and social rights such as freedom of 
expression and workers‘ rights seem to be sustained at low levels similar to the pre-
candidacy period.‖38  Kubicek states that although Turkey‘s EU candidacy, along 
with the opening represented by the 1999 Marmara earthquake, opened up a space 
                                                          
32
 Toktas and Aras, "The Eu and Minority Rights in Turkey." p700. 
33
 Ibid. p702 
34
 V.H. Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," International Journal 61, no. 1 (2005). 
p31. 
35
 Bora Kanra, "Democracy, Islam and Dialogue: The Case of Turkey," Government and Opposition 
40, no. 4 (2005). p515. 
36
 Grigoriadis, "Islam and Democratization in Turkey: Secularism and Trust in a Divided Society." 
p1196. 
37
 Ibid. p1207. 
38
 Demet Yalcin Mousseau, "Is Turkey Democratizing with Eu Reforms?: An Assessment of Human 
Rights, Corruption and Socio-Economic Conditions," Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12, 
no. 1 (2012). p76. 
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for liberalization and democratization, this has mostly been filled by rhetoric, and 
powerful forces continue to frustrate reform.
39
 
The inability of Turkish civil society to flourish given these openings and 
concomitantly to instead be filled by conservative forces indicates the qualitative 
shortcomings of civil society in Turkey.  Namely, a lack of trust of other groups in 
Turkish society, coupled with privileged state relationships for certain actors, 
impedes civil society. 
―In Turkey, such lingering impediments as populism, clientelism, 
and opportunism seem to have prevented the members of civil 
society from entertaining an idea of a common good ...  This state 
of affairs must also have had an adverse impact on the 
development of trust among the members of civil society and, 
consequently, on the building of horizontal linkages among the 
members of civil society.  Similarly, the continuing weakness of 
civil society has prevented it from acting as an efficacious 
countervailing power vis-à-vis the state.‖40  
 
This passage indicates that horizontal linkages are integral to a qualitatively 
enriched civil society.  A significant example of the lack of horizontal linkages in 
Turkish society is seen with the activity of Sunni-Islam civil society groups.  Even 
when the issues that majority-Sunni religious groups are advocating for are issues 
that affect all religious groups, such as the right to wear a headscarf and practice 
religion without repression, majority-Sunni religious groups do not frame their 
advocacy beyond their particular religious framework.  Although at least one Sunni 
group ―[has] expressed a desire to expand their repertoire to reflect that of a 
universal human rights organization ... The leader of the group confirmed that the 
organization had remained narrow in focus because of the demands of its 
members.‖41  After conducting an analysis of three Islamic non-governmental 
organizations, Kadıoğlu identifies that they all have at least one thing in common: a 
moralism which ultimately inhibits sympathy with other marginalized groups who 
face similar problems.  This is especially the case with Islamic groups which 
                                                          
39
 P. Kubicek, "The Earthquake, the European Union and Political Reform in Turkey," Mediterranean 
Politics 7, no. 1 (2002). See also Paul Kubicek, "The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political 
Change in Turkey," Middle East 5, no. 2 (2001). 
40
 Heper and Yıldırım, "Revisiting Civil Society in Turkey." p12. 
41
 A. Sarkissian and Ş.İ. Özler, "Democratization and the Politicization of Religious Civil Society in 
Turkey," (2012). p11. 
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advocate for women‘s rights who cannot support broader women‘s rights 
movements which would include advocating, for example, for the rights of 
prostitutes and homosexuals.
42
  What these examples show, according to Kadıoğlu, 
is a general in-group mentality which also indicates that a general suspicion of the 
rights of others is pervasive in Turkish society. 
Qualitative short-comings reflect an in-group mentality which is concomitant 
with fragmentation in society, and can be seen in examples of problematic horizontal 
relationships.  In short, qualitative short-comings reflect a lack of horizontal 
relations which can bridge social cleavages, and a lack of tolerant, open attitudes 
towards other groups in society.  Toros‘s study of civil society in Turkey is 
indicative of the pervasive nature of in-group mentalities in Turkish civil society.  
Stating at the outset that ―[t]hrough membership to civil society organizations, 
citizens may develop their qualities of trust, confidence, and cooperation,‖ which are 
then ―expected to reappear and settle in the political culture of the society,‖43 Toros 
finds that an environment, i.e. a vibrant civil society, ―should produce a number of 
practices such as social compromise, tolerance, political democracy, and the like‖ 
which are all missing in the Turkish context.
44
  Problematic horizontal relations are 
compounded by problematic vertical relations, that is, the lack of horizontal relations 
in Turkish society is compounded by a tradition of the Turkish state fostering 
vertical relationships with privileged actors.  This two-dimensional problem is 
evident in the number of explanations put forward to explain a lack of buy-in to EU 
reforms by the Turkish public.  A lack of buy-in to EU reforms is considered 
indicative of horizontal relations that are intolerant and closed to the plight of 
minority groups in society. 
The lack of buy-in to democratic reforms by the Turkish public is evidenced 
by Kubicek who finds that while there is support for democratic principles and 
human rights in the abstract, when applied to specific human rights issues and 
democratization requirements such support falls away dramatically.  The point he 
makes  
                                                          
42
 Ayşe Kadıoğlu, "Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey: A Study of Three Islamic 
Non‐Governmental Organizations," The Muslim World 95, no. 1 (2005). 
43
 Emre Toros, "Understanding the Role of Civil Society as an Agent for Democratic Consolidation: 
The Turkish Case," Turkish Studies 8, no. 3 (2007). p399. 
44
 Ibid. p405. 
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―is that there is some evidence to suggest that the Turkish public 
supported the reforms as a response to EU conditionality when 
they were adopted.  In other words, there is little to suggest that 
some of the most basic reforms demanded by Europe – and this 
would include provisions for the Kurdish language, as minority 
rights are integral to the Copenhagen Criteria – were driven by 
grassroots forces.  Without pressure from the outside, it is highly 
doubtful that such reforms would have been adopted.‖45 
Identifying the lack of buy-in from the public is difficult, and a number of 
explanations are put forward.  What these different explanations reflect, however, is 
either a vertical or horizontal dimension.  That is, they either reflect privileged 
vertical relations, or deficient horizontal relations.  The vertical dimension of this 
problem refers to the relations privileged societal actors have with state elites who 
are conservative in nature and represent the closest link to the Ottoman state 
tradition.  In the literature, the inability of Turkish civil society to establish effective 
horizontal relations is usually put down to this vertical dimension, i.e. it is a strong 
state tradition that inhibits civil society.  The next section first describes these elites 
and outlines their resistance to democratic reform before highlighting the vertical 
relationships they have established which bolster their power in an increasingly 
democratic polity and privilege certain groups. 
State Elites and Resistance to Democratization 
 Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the strong-state tradition, 
which is a continuation of an Ottoman ethos, has been embodied by Kemalism.
46
  
Kemalist ideology grew out of the Turkish War of Independence and was further 
developed by Kemal Ataturk during the Single Party Period leading up to the 
Second World War.  Kemalism is both ―one of the strongest currents to have 
influenced Turkish political culture‖ and ―somewhat of a problematic and fuzzy 
concept to deal with.‖47  This stems from the pragmatic approach it directs to its 
                                                          
45
 P. Kubicek, "The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey," ibid.6(2005). 
pp372-373. Italics in original. 
46
 METIN HEPER, "The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and 
Germany Compared," Comparative Political Studies 25, no. 2 (1992). 
47
 Sinan Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, Seculrism and 
Nationalism, vol. 10, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics (London: Routledge, 2009). p6. 
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somewhat vague goal; ―to bring the nation-state of Turkey to the level of the 
advanced states of the world explains the essence of Kemalist reforms.‖48   
 Kemalism and Turkish state elites are predominantly represented in the 
military, which proactively resists some of the most significant reform processes, 
notably those concerning minority rights.  The Turkish military is the most 
significant site of resistance to reform according to EU criteria because of its 
privileged role, established during the Turkish War of Independence, as guardians of 
the republic.  Furthermore, along with ―[t]he army‘s heroic status as guardian, the 
perception of external military threats from the region, and favorable portrayals in 
the media and in schools have facilitated the army‘s strong presence in society.‖49  
The Turkish army‘s resistance to a number of Copenhagen Criteria is, on the face of 
it, surprising, considering; 
―The army has played a prominent role in Turkey‘s political 
modernization leading the country along a Western path, by 
endorsing the dynamic transformation of the Turkish state and 
society, in line with Atatürk‘s ideological commitment to the West.  
It also intervened politically to counter the forces blocking this 
transformation and to preserve democracy, secularism, and 
national unity in the face Islamist, separatist, and sectarian 
challenges.‖50 
Specifically, this role of guardian entails defending the six principles of Kemalism: 
nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and reformism, and when 
viewed from this perspective it is easy to see how the army‘s priorities do not match 
up with the Copenhagen criteria.
51
  For one thing, as Öniş points out, the version of 
modernity aspired to by the Turkish military, partly informed by Turkist 
nationalism, is no longer in line with the post-modern ideals of the EU, a hallmark of 
which ―is recognition of multiple identities with a strong emphasis on the promotion 
of minority rights.‖52  The underlying rationale of resistance to reforms which would 
allow for the freedom of cultural and ethnic expression concerns the risks that such 
measures would supposedly present to the state.  This especially relates to the 
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Kurdish population in Turkey.  The military fear ―that broadening the space for 
identity politics would encourage not only rising fundamentalism but also Kurdish 
separatism,‖53 overarching which is the argument that such reforms would threaten 
Turkey‘s territorial integrity.  The military thus proactively counter democratic 
reform through informal mechanisms ―which have effectively preserved the balance 
of power on the side of the military.‖54   ―[A]ny demand for expanding cultural 
rights to a level that may provoke the fear of separation is met with suspicion and is 
rejected, if not blocked.‖55  Furthermore, the security mindset of the military 
concerning the right of minorities to self-determination is complemented by a more 
purely nationalistic attitude put forward by right-wing political elites.  For example, 
for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the ‗Kurdish question‘ is framed as an 
issue concerning terrorism.
56
   
 This sort of nationalistic attitude is also evident within the Turkish judiciary, 
which Patton describes as the ―civilian doppelganger to the military‖ and states that 
it is a ―key instrument of anti-EU forces.57  Take, for example, Turkey‘s 
Constitutional Court which, in 2008, only narrowly allowed the ruling AKP party to 
remain active after a landslide election victory, for allegedly endangering the secular 
foundation of the state due to its support, and the subsequent passing of a 
constitutional amendment the aim of which was to allow the use of the headscarf in 
the university campuses.  In annulling the amendment, ―[t]he Chief Justice of the 
Court in his statement announcing the verdict, underlined that this was a ‗serious 
warning‘ to the government party not to violate the Republic‘s principles of 
secularism.‖58  The judiciary‘s anti-reformist agenda represents illiberal and anti-
democratic views which ―stem from its statist priorities that put the interests of the 
state above the rights of individuals‖59 and suspicion ―that EU reforms will empower 
Islamists and Kurdish separatists.‖60 
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 Along with concerns about the expression of cultural rights by groups deemed 
to present threats to national security and unity, a corresponding concern within 
Kemalist political elites focuses on threats to Turkey‘s secular identity.  For 
example, Baç highlights the fact that the concerns of the Kemalist elite are focused 
not only on the threat that the expression of cultural rights represents, particularly 
with reference to the idea of Kurdish seperatism, but also on the threat of divisive 
cleavages represented by Islamic fundamentalism.
61
  The decision of the 
Constitutional Court mentioned above ―[reinforced] claims by intellectuals about the 
rise of a ‗juristocracy‘, a regime where the sovereignty does not belong to the people 
or the parliament but to the judiciary.‖62  This idea can be attributed to all state elites 
mentioned here and hence contributes to Poulton‘s argument that because the 
Turkish military ―is inimical to all forms of expression other than the official 
Kemalist line ... the Turkish polity is inimical to civil society per se,‖63 a condition 
that undermines the quality of Turkey‘s horizontal relations.  
 Kemalist state elites have established a number of vertical relationships which 
contribute to the short-comings of Turkish civil society.  Many of these occur 
through the military.  Indeed, the Turkish military, whose autonomy is considered to 
be a major impediment to democratic consolidation, ―attempt to bolster their 
autonomy from civilian governments with the argument that they have always had a 
special relationship with the people.‖64  One of the most pervasive of these is the 
relationships the military has institutionalized with Turkish students through the 
state education system.
65
  Güney and Karatekelioğlu, for example, show how the 
military is directly involved in high school curricula which particularize human 
rights.  In addition they highlight a mandatory course in the high school curriculum, 
taught since 1926, by military officers and with a textbook written by military 
personnel, which aims at political socialization of young citizens.  They state that 
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this course, ―[i]nstead of developing citizens with a wide perspective and a critical 
stance, this curriculum encourages students to be suspicious of all foreigners, 
particularly people from neighbouring countries; to fear all differences... and to treat 
their non-Muslim friends as categorically different (in fact as non-Turkish).‖66  It is 
especially effective considering the ramifications engaging with people at this age 
have for future civic identity.
67
  Furthermore, this is part of a broader public relations 
strategy which promotes ―its ‗national security concept‘ to raise citizens‘ 
consciousness about internal and external threats that it identifies.‖68 
 The relationship that the military establishes with students is continued, at 
least for young men, with mandatory military service.  This facilitates concordance 
between the army and society through intimate and informal links between military 
brass and the citizen army; ―the officer corps is not a separate and exclusionary 
institution.  Rather, it comprises a group of elite soldiers who sustain a citizens‘ 
army largely by maintaining the respect and trust of the citizen soldiers.‖69  This 
does not, however, indicate a close relationship between military officers and 
citizens.  Military culture in Turkey is concerned also with public appearance, and is 
organised in such a way that elite soldiers ―are at once distant from society, yet are 
perceived to be an organic part of it.‖70  Ultimately, Turkey‘s management of 
vertical civil-military relations results in a concordance between the military and 
citizenry and ―an endorsing political culture.‖71 
As well as the vertical relations mentioned above, since the rise of multi-
party democracy, political patronage has become a facet of contemporary Turkish 
politics, as state elites seek to maintain political support.
72
  This refers to the ongoing 
practice of forming links ―with leading economic interest group associations and 
some key persons such as local notables and others who could mobilize votes for 
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them.‖73  The Alevi provide a good example of this.  Due to its close relationship 
with Kemalist elites, the most powerful Alevi group undermines Alevi desire for 
self-determination.  Erman and Göker point out that their defence of Kemalist 
ideology, such as secularism, ultimately serves to facilitate the continued erosion of 
Alevi influence in local politics and are thus ―skeptical [sic] about the possible 
contributions of Alevi politics to Turkish democracy, as shaped under current 
political conditions.‖74   
Concomitant with political patronage, another example of detrimental 
vertical relations is the continuing dependency of the Turkish economy on the state.  
Şimşek points out that the state is still the biggest economic patron in Turkish 
society.  Not only is the degree of dependency of private industry and business on 
the state ‗remarkable,‘ ―[d]ependency on bureaucracy and government as institutions 
which control the framework of economic activity may take extreme forms since this 
relation is hardly formalized or institutionalised [sic].  Consequently, state-business 
relations may easily turn into clientelism and patronage relations.‖75  A significant 
ramification of this sort of dependency is the necessity for businesses and other 
groups to get on well with the state, and thus not challenge it.  Especially 
problematic for the functioning of civil society, this applies to the education sector 
as well as the media, who reliance on the state therefore means they ―cannot 
pressure the state to liberalize and democratize.‖76  Mousseau extends this insight 
and argues that the nature of Turkey‘s economy, especially the existence of 
―clientelist networks competing aggressively over state rents ... may explain the 
unstable and illiberal nature of Turkey‘s democracy.‖77 
Finally, a very significant vertical relationship established by state elites 
which privilege certain groups concerns the role of religion in Turkish society, 
namely the priority given to Sunni Islam.  This may sound surprising, given 
Turkey‘s avowedly secular state, but describing Turkey as a secular state is 
inaccurate.  This is because it does not ―[involve] a neutral stance toward different 
religious beliefs, as well as the phenomenon of religion in general.  A genuinely 
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secular state has no preferential links with any religion and neither promotes nor 
obstructs religious beliefs among its citizens.  The republican Turkish state fulfils 
neither of these conditions.‖  The Turkish state is instead both ‗assertively‘ secular 
due to its ―aggressive measures to put religious institutions under its firm control and 
promote a ‗religion-free‘, ‗rational‘ society‖ and has repeatedly compromised this 
assertively secular character ―toward championing a certain form of state religion,‖ 
that is, Sunni Islam.  Thus, as Türkmen points out, ―Turkish secularism is commonly 
understood to be based not on the exclusion of religion from the system since its 
inception but, rather, on the control and reinterpretation of Islam by the state.‖78 
Türkmen highlights the use of state education in fostering a national morality 
which subscribes to Kemalist ideology.  Importantly, he notes that the education 
curriculum concerning religious studies increasingly prioritises Sunni Islam in 
proportion to a decrease in content concerning other religions.  He states that ―[s]uch 
changes reveal the consequences of political and social changes occurring in the 
Turkish public sphere, in parallel with the transformation of Islamic actors 
themselves,‖ namely, the integration of Islamic actors into the social system.79  The 
transformation of Islamic actors refers to the electoral success of the moderately 
Islamic Justice and Development Party and concomitant politicization of religious 
civil society since the 1990s.  Although the ‗civil society opportunity structure‘ is 
open to all religious groups, the Sunni Islam‘s privileged relationship with the state 
due to the assumption of religious homogeneity in Turkey means that only Sunni-
Islam groups can effectively enter their concerns into the public sphere,
80
 thus 
further depriving minority religious groups. 
 Other problematic vertical relations which explain the lack of buy-in by the 
Turkish public can also be seen.  Ergun, for example, points out that it could be the 
result of a concern that the substantial involvement of European actors in efforts to 
energize Turkish civil society has detrimental effects concerning its qualitative 
nature; ―dependency on international funding and project-based work has alienated 
domestic civil society actors from their grassroots bases, and weakened their 
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relations with core supporters and members.‖81  Additionally, Tocci argues that ―the 
accession process has not entailed sufficiently dense and widespread contacts 
between Turkish officials and non-official actors with the EU institutional 
framework.‖82   
The problematic nature of Turkey‘s horizontal relations is not as clear or as 
fully articulated in the literature on civil society, but a number of examples can still 
be drawn upon, and much of the literature speaks at least broadly of this 
deficiency.
83
  Şimşek tells us that ―[d]eep fragmentation in [Turkish] civil society is 
accompanied by a lack of tolerance and respect for others.‖84  Therefore, when 
particular advocacy groups gain power in society, they tend to stifle, circumscribe or 
ignore other social issues.  Şimşek draws on an example which illustrates this 
problem.    
―The following experiment conducted by two female journalists 
shows this general problem of intolerance in a theatrical style.  
―They went to a movie theatre in Fatih, a district of Istanbul known 
for its religious conservatism, dressed in mini-skirts, and 
alternatively, to an exclusive night club, wearing black veils.  In 
both instances they were forced to leave the premises.‖‖85 
Another instance of intolerance in Turkish civil society is the example of Prime 
Minister Erdogan‘s wife who ―was attacked in the media for her preference for 
wearing a headscarf to an official event and was discouraged from attending on 
more than one occasion.‖86 
Furthermore, the problematic nature of Turkey‘s horizontal relations can be 
seen in the fact that divisions within political elites concerning the legitimacy of EU 
‗interference‘ generate an inconsistent application of European norms.87  This 
argument is supported by Heper who points to a ‗bifurcation‘ of state and political 
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elites.  When they emerged after the Second World War, ―[t]he political elite 
subscribed to popular democracy and placed narrow political interests over the 
general public interest.  For the state elite, the Republic came first and democracy 
second.‖88  Although this situation has changed since 1980, with the military 
generally accepting the legitimacy of particularistic interests, ―the state elite still 
does not trust the political elite‖ some of whom it still believes ―place party or even 
personal interests above the long-term interests of the nation.‖89  Hence, ―if in the 
military‘s opinion the vital interests of the country are at stake, it could intervene, 
according to provisions in the 1982 constitution and the bylaws of the military that 
entrust the officer corps with the duty of defending the country against internal as 














                                                          
88
 Metin Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics," Journal of International Affairs-
Columbia University 54, no. 1 (2000). p73. 
89
 Ibid. p77. 
90
 Ibid. 
24 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 2: Structural Qualities of Civil Society 
The above examples of the shortcomings of Turkish civil society are 
indicative of a public sphere lacking the qualitative requirements that would 
facilitate bottom-up democratization.  There is a concern that progress so far made in 
the reform process stipulated by the EU has been responding mainly to the material 
incentives of conditionality rather than to the moral underpinnings of reforms.
91
  
Furthermore, ―Turkey [continues to pursue] its conventional approach to the 
protection of minorities in its relations with the EU and does not plan to change the 
qualitative nature of these rights.‖92  This is problematic because, following Putnam, 
the existence of civil society organizations are beneficial to democracy only when 
they fulfil; 
―their capacity to socialize participants into the ‗norms of 
generalized reciprocity‘ and ‗trust‘ that are essential components 
of the ‗social capital‘ needed for effective cooperation.  Civil 
associations [are supposed to] provide the ‗networks of civil 
engagement‘ within which reciprocity is learned and enforced, 
trust is generated, and communication and patterns of collective 
action are facilitated.‖93 
Currently, Turkish civil society is more accurately represented by Putnam‘s 
description of ―dense but segregated horizontal networks [which] sustain 
cooperation within each group‖94 but, as Foley and Edwards point out, ―may or may 
not contribute to effective democratic governance.‖  Indeed, ―at times they become 
the basis for social strife.‖95  Effective civil associations, that is, horizontal networks 
which ―cut across social cleavages [and] nourish wider cooperation‖96 can be 
referred to as ‗secondary structures‘ that generate social capital.   
In the literature on civil society, ‗secondary structures‘ represent a structural 
component that operates independently of central government and is based on 
property rights.  More broadly, they can be conceived as ―corporate bodies with 
autonomous jurisdiction ... which formed the institutional base of civil society in the 
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West.‖97  The fact that they are based on property rights indicates that the concept of 
civil society is closely linked to the development of liberal economic relations, 
relations which were then codified by citizenship rights.  This section briefly 
provides an account of the evolution of civil society along with citizenship, as it was 
the codification of citizenship that indicated the concrete emergence and expansion 
of a public sphere existing between the state and family structures.  This account of 
the evolution of civil society/citizenship is important because it highlights the 
distinctively cultural underpinnings of their emergence.  The economic nature of 
civil society was necessarily facilitated by the emergence of a particular class, the 
bourgeoisie, acting as a social carrier. Following this, the argument that the 
Ottoman Empire lacked civil society is outlined.  This leads us in to an analysis of 
society during the late-Ottoman period, during which time the Ottoman state and its 
society were subjected to numerous reforms inspired by increased interaction with 
European modernity. 
Bernhard tells us that ―[c]ivil society as an historical phenomenon first began 
to take shape in late medieval-early modern Europe.  It refers to social groups who 
were emancipated from restrictions placed upon them by feudal and absolutist 
systems.‖98  Actually existing civil societies have varied greatly, ―but it almost 
always dealt with social and political life beyond the domestic sphere of home and 
family.‖99  Bernhard reduces the diversity of examples of civil society down to a 
structural and institutional definition and describes civil society as ―a public space 
structurally located between official public and private life and populated by a range 
of different autonomous organizations.  Thus, civil society has concrete structural 
boundaries and is populated by a diverse set of agents.‖100  Likewise, Janoski states 
that ―[c]ivil society represents a sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse 
between the state, the public sphere consisting of voluntary organizations, and the 
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market sphere concerning private firms and unions‖ and can be applied to all 
countries ―if they have private organizations between the state and the family.‖101 
The structural nature of civil society is a result of its economic legacy.  The 
rise of commercial and merchant classes within European feudal systems led to a 
shared understanding of interests.  Furthermore, the geographical nature of 
commercial organizations, namely the fact that they congregated in towns and cities, 
made it possible for some autonomy of rule, especially concerning economic 
matters, to be granted within the feudal system.  Over time, this nascent bourgeoisie 
began to understand the value of a sphere autonomous from the arbitrary power of 
absolutist rule which had established itself after feudalism.  Thus economic 
autonomy evolved into a broader conception of autonomy for social actors.  ―This 
new public space came to be situated between the official public life of the 
monarchy, the state, and the nobility, and that of private and/or communal life.‖102  
Having been allowed the freedom to organize their own affairs as long as they didn‘t 
conflict with the state, they eventually grew to such a level of sophistication and 
organization that ―they were able to compel the state through political struggles to 
recognize and respect their existence.  With time they were able to use this 
autonomy from the state to institutionalize influence over the official political sphere 
and radically alter it.‖103  Critically, this capacity to radically alter the state was 
made possible by the creation of legal boundaries which protected nascent civil 
society from the exercise of state power.  Therefore, Bernhard claims that the most 
important requirement for a civil society to be truly emancipatory is the sanction of 
the state; ―the public space must be guaranteed as a realm of freedom from the state 
and by the state itself...  Barring this, a liberated public space would be but an 
anarchy of competing interests.‖104  This means that the state must recognise the 
value of allowing civil society to exist, that is, that it is in its own best interests.  
This is because ―[s]trengthening civil society also serves to strengthen the state 
itself.‖105 
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The economic dimension of civil society as it emerged as an historical 
phenomenon led it away from earlier Enlightenment conceptions which idealized it 
as ―a utopian plan for a future civilization in which the people would live together in 
peace as politically mature, responsible citizens.‖106  The influence of economic 
considerations distinguished a sphere separate from the state defined by the 
existence of a bourgeois middle-class rather than ―a ‗civil society‘ made up of 
citizens.‖107 108  Following the claim that effective citizenship rights represent the 
codification of civil society, Kalberg‘s argument ―that cultural forces [have played] 
a central part in the rise of modern citizenship‖109 is in other words an argument 
highlighting the necessity of ‗civil‘ relations for the establishment of modern 
citizenship rights.  Kalberg argues that ―[t]he development of pre-modern citizenship 
by no means occurred in some ‗automatic‘ sense with the rise of cities, increasing 
trade, industrialization, and expansion of the public sphere.‖110  Fundamentally, what 
is required for the emergence of pre-modern citizenship is a cultural transformation; 
―a shattering of personal ties of allegiance typically cultivated in [traditional] 
groupings‖ without which ―no formulation of impersonal and binding notions of 
civil rights can occur.‖111 
 Referring to the structural nature of civil society, Mardin tells us that the 
Ottoman Empire lacked ‗civil society‘: ―It lacked that basic structural component ... 
a part of society that could operate independently of central government and was 
based on property rights.‖112  Historically, ―[c]ivil society emerged as a critical idea 
and oppositional force in the age of absolutism,‖113 however, referring to a history of 
civil society which saw it develop in conjunction with autonomous cities
114
, Mardin 
states that Ottoman state policies restricted the development of the structural 
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conditions, ‗secondary structures‘, which would facilitate the development of civil 
society; they ―did not permit the development of true urban autonomy.‖115  This lack 
of ‗civil society‘ constitutes a significant contrast between Ottoman society and its 
European counterparts.  Instead of societal evolution towards differentiation of 
governmental functions, the dispersal of authority remained diffuse.  Not only was 
this diffuseness evident in the lack of structural conditions which chimed with the 
first and second estates in Europe, but was also evident in the legal system.  Due to 
the patrimonial nature of the system, all problems of law and adjudication were 
reduced to administrative matters and impersonal legal norms did not develop.
116
  
Thus, not only were corporate bodies with autonomous jurisdictions inhibited as the 
result of a power struggle with the bureaucracy
117
, that is, explained with reference 
to a power struggle between different groups, they were also inhibited because of 
more cultural reasons, namely the continuance of patrimonial authority. 
The patrimonial Ottoman system inhibited civil society from forming, and 
therefore, no shattering of personal ties of allegiance was forthcoming.  This is 
because  
 
―in order for civil society to develop fully and be maintained in the 
long run it needs political institutions that satisfy the criteria of a 
constitutional state and the rule of law, that permit democratic 
participation, the making of decisions on fundamental principles, 
setting legal conditions, and intervening to protect, foster and 
reconcile its citizens.  The inherently diverse civil society finds the 
unity it needs only in a democratic state under the rule of law.‖118 
 
The patrimonial nature of the system produced two structural qualities in the 
Ottoman Empire, a diffuse authority structure complemented by a dichotomous 
cultural structure.  Importantly, the diffuse nature of authority (for example, the 
cross-over roles that notables tended to inhabit
119
) resulted in a lack of 
differentiation among state functions which in turn led to a culture of dependence on 
the state for support.  Universal dependence on the state inhibited ‗revolutionary‘ 
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struggles against the state, which thus ―did not have the organizational autonomy 
that would permit the consolidation of victories.‖120  This meant that a middle-class, 
that is, a group distinct from both nobility, or in the Ottoman case, the bureaucracy, 
and the common masses, was unable to form.  Furthermore, without the shattering of 
personal ties of allegiance that the rise of a bourgeoisie would have facilitated, the 
Ottoman legacy of the Turkish polity is one in which particularistic allegiances were 
very important. 
 The fact that civil society did not exist in the Ottoman Empire is the starting 
point of an analysis that attempts to trace the cultural underpinnings of the 
qualitative deficiency of contemporary Turkish civil society.  The lack of civil 
society in the Ottoman Empire combined with the fact that the late Ottoman period 
is characterized by increased interaction with European modernity indicates that the 
Ottoman state responded to this period of transformation in its own particular way.  
The final chapter is an analysis of the transformation of the Ottoman state into the 
Turkish Republic during this time.  In investigating the policies and practices of this 
era which were concerned with mediating state/society relations it attempts to 
highlight the cultural legacy of the modern Turkish state.  This supports the 
argument put forward which posits that statist responses in this period 
institutionalized societal relations which persists to this day, relations which inhibit 
the functioning of an effective civil society.  The paper thus contributes to an 
emerging body of literature tracing the lineages of the modern Turkish state to the 
reform era of the Ottoman Empire, and also puts forward a complementary argument 
to the one which blames the short-comings of Turkish civil society solely on its 
strong state tradition.  Before moving on to my own analysis of Turkey‘s Ottoman 
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Chapter Three: Literature review: Turkey‘s Ottoman Legacy 
Analysis of Turkey‘s Ottoman legacy is a relatively new but increasingly 
covered topic.  Previously it has been obscured by a ―self-imposed amnesia.‖121  
Currently, one can point to a number of treatments of this topic.  For example, 
Walker contends that Turkey‘s ―status and ambition as a regional and global 
player‖122 can only be understood if we also understand the Turkish public‘s 
―historical memory of past-leadership.‖123  Alternatively, Akturk argues that the 
discrepancy between the official view of Turkish citizenship and the actual religious 
connotations that Turkish citizenship entails can be put down to the persistence of 
the millet system.  He states that ―there is a striking continuity between the Islamic 
millet (religious community) in the Ottoman Empire and the understanding of the 
modern Turkish millet (revealingly, millet is the most widely used Turkish word for 
nation) after the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.‖124  Furthermore, he 
shows ―how the Ottoman legacy of defining communal and personal identity on the 
basis of religious affiliation structures the politics of ethnic recognition in Turkey 
today.‖125   
 Akturk‘s analysis highlights the two-step process through which Turkey is 
influenced by its Ottoman legacy.  First, you have the continuation or influence of 
the Ottoman polity on the early republican period, which is followed by the 
influence of the early republican period on contemporary Turkey.  While the second 
part of this process is well covered, the significant impact the Ottoman polity had on 
the early Turkish republic is less comprehensive.  A major factor for this was the 
effectiveness of republican rhetoric which posited a clean break with its imperial 
past; ―an attempt on the part of the republican elite to construct oblivion in the 
society about the multicultural Ottoman past in order to constitute a Turkish national 
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identity.‖126  Because of this, insights which link the Ottoman past to the Turkish 
present are even less evident. 
 Çağaptay and Isyar provide examples of research into the continuity between 
the Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic, also with reference to 
citizenship.  Çağaptay‘s argument supports Akturk‘s above, by concluding that ―not 
ethnicity but the legacy of the millet system and ethno-religious identities shaped 
Turkey‘s citizenship policies in the interwar period.‖127  Isyar, on the other hand, 
argues that the rhetoric of racialized citizenship which made possible the emergence 
and dominance of Turkism is the result of a dominant discourse of modernity which 
first established itself in the late-Ottoman Empire.
128
  In contrast, Zürcher provided 
an early example of research into the continuity between the Ottoman Empire and 
the early Turkish Republic by highlighting the similarities between the Young Turks 
of the late-Ottoman period and the Kemalists who established the Republic. 
Zürcher charts the continuity between Young Turks and Kemalists on three 
levels: social background, organizational characteristics, and ideology.
129
  Socially, 
both groups shared educational and professional backgrounds, and were both 
products of the new Western-type schools operating in the late-Ottoman Empire.  
Organizationally, both groups ―had their roots in extra-parliamentarian, unofficial 
organizations‖ which resulted in their parliamentary wings playing a secondary role 
to central committees.  Ideologically, a number of themes are identified. First, both 
groups were committed to saving and strengthening the state.  According to Zürcher, 
it was only geopolitical contingencies that saw the Young Turks committed to 
empire, and the Kemalists to the nation-state.  Indeed, a commitment to nationalism 
became prevalent within the Young Turks as these geopolitical realities began to be 
established.  Second, both groups were committed to secularism, and at the same 
time, both used Islam opportunistically.  Third, both groups were committed to 
positivism: ―the belief that objective truth could be correctly interpreted by the use 
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of scientific methods.‖130  This was reflected in their understanding of the 
parliamentary process; rather than being a vehicle for popular representation, it was 
instead considered a place where rational discussion (among elites) could generate 
ideal policy.  Finally, both groups, ground in the old statist tradition as well as a 
military/bureaucratic environment, believed that ―only the state could serve as a 
motor of modernization and progress.‖131  For both groups, the idea of a small liberal 
state that only secured the conditions in which individuals could freely go about 
their business was not entertained. 
That the liberal ideal of a small state held no appeal reflects the idea that the 
Ottoman state was responsible for the welfare of its subjects.  This paternalism is 
one of the themes that Heper identifies not only as linking the Ottoman Empire with 
the early republican state, but also as continuing to influence contemporary Turkish 
politics.  Heper states that the belief that the Ottoman state was directly responsible 
for the welfare of its subjects is a central Ottoman norm, established over hundreds 
of years, which, in conjunction with a number of other norms, continue to affect 
contemporary Turkish politics.  The others he identifies are; eternal vigilance of the 
world around them; harmony within society (maintenance of law and order); a 
dichotomy between rulers and ruled; and politics characterized by personal rule.  
Accordingly, ―[t]he Ottoman desire for a strong state that would regulate the polity 
and society from above [has] left a particular imprint on democracy in Turkey.‖132 
According to Heper, these themes ultimately resulted in a superiority 
complex as ―elites came to see the general population as unsophisticated.‖133  A 
belief that was further imbedded as Ottoman elites, notably the Young Ottomans, 
began to have increased interactions with European modernity: ―they equated their 
newly acquired knowledge with political legitimacy.‖134  This initially was focused 
on ideas surrounding rational government and bureaucratic structures, but was 
extended by the Young Turks who incorporated ideas from the new social sciences, 
especially sociology. 
                                                          
130




 Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics." p71. 
133
 Ibid. p67. 
134
 Ibid. 
33 | P a g e  
 
Although the justifications may have gone through permutations, 
concomitant with the idea that ―the salvation of the state resided in the welfare of the 
state,‖135 the unity of the state remained the overall objective.  This had critical 
ramifications.  Entrenched in this mindset, the importance or value of periphery 
structures remained obscured, and ―politico-cultural problems took precedence over 
socio-economic issues.‖136  This resulted in the inability of the state to respond to 
structural pressures stemming from new ‗global‘ economic conditions, namely the 
emergence of capitalist relations.  ―For instance, the Ottoman elite had no interest in 
mercantilism and did not even use tariffs to collect revenue.  In the view of the 
ruling elite, peace and prosperity depended on keeping the members of each class in 
their respective places.  Old norms prevented the elite from understanding the logic 
of a capitalist economy.‖137 
The unity of the state and its personal responsibility to provide for the 
welfare of its subjects led to a privileged concern with law and order, which was 
reinforced at the start of the republican era as the decline and fall of the Ottoman 
Empire remained fresh in the Kemalists memory.  ―In the early years of the 
Republic, the founders were afraid that the country could be torn apart along 
primordial lines at any moment.‖138  This legacy continues to be seen in the rhetoric 
around the idea of being ‗one and together‘ and in consensus over social issues being 
forced by unanimity.  ―[The] overemphasis on harmony constituted a serious barrier 
to the emergence of adversarial politics in Republican Turkey,‖139 a barrier which 
continues to be evident through examples of intolerance for political opposition.
140
 
The intolerance of political opposition reflects and is compounded by a 
dichotomy between rulers and ruled, which is perpetuated in the bifurcation of the 
elite, a consequence of the regime being opened up by Kemalists, in 1930 and 1945, 
to ‗educated‘ Turks.  The state elite continued to espouse Kemalist ideology, while a 
new ‗political‘ elite subscribed to popular democracy, placing, in contrast to 
Kemalism, narrow political interests over the general public interest.  The 
diametrically opposed positions fostered zero-sum attitudes and continued to 
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constrict any societal dynamism.
141
  Only since 1980 have there been political 
leaders who have not looked down upon the rest of the country.  However, state 
elites continue to ―[look] down upon the views offered on the state of the economy 
by leading interest groups.‖142  This can be seen in an article which is most relevant 
to this paper, concerning civil society, or rather, the lack of it in both the Ottoman 
Empire and modern-day Turkey.  The themes identified by Heper above have been 
interpreted as a strong-state tradition which characterizes Turkey‘s legacy, the 
correlate of which is a weak civil society, and following Çaha, the lack of a liberal-
minimal state, which failed to be entertained in the Ottoman tradition, has been 
problematic from a civil society perspective; ―the minimal state, the concept that is 
the backbone of liberal political thought, is the most necessary if civil society is to 
spring into life.‖143  Karaman and Aras build upon this and argue that the 
patrimonial structure inherited from the Ottoman Empire continues to manifest itself 
in military interventions and constitutional measures infused with an official 
ideology based on ―the protection of the state and the survival of the regime.‖144   
Karaman and Aras argue that ―[t]he main obstacles that continue to impede 
progress towards a more authentic and truly functional civil society can be classified 
under five different categories, all of which are a result of state hegemony over civil 
society.‖145   This analysis thus supports and extends Heper‘s insight that the 
Ottoman legacy has left a particular imprint on Turkish democracy.  Karaman and 
Aras fill in some of the gaps concerning precisely what this imprint is.  The five 
categories they speak of broadly describe this legacy.  They are: an unstable 
democratic process; bureaucratic centralization; intolerance of political opposition; 
state dominance over (or lack of respect for) civil rights and freedom; and, the 
ideological structure of state control.
146
  The main thesis of Karaman and Aras‘s 
argument is that the strong-state tradition in Turkey, reinforced by the perpetuation 
of an official ideology, impedes the development of fully harmonious state-society 
relations due to its curtailing of freedom of thought and expression.  According to 
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them, ―the main obstacle to the further development of Turkish civil society has 
been the state‘s unwillingness to respond to the demands of the people.‖147 
Karaman and Aras‘s argument is valid and insightful, but its state-centric 
analysis, I argue, relies too heavily on an ideological argument in explaining societal 
relations, and leaves room for more analysis from a societal perspective.  Their 
argument is concerned with ―[t]he state‘s reluctance to create channels of 
communication with its own civilian population‖ and ―[t]he state‘s refusal to embark 
on an honest and constructive dialogue with the organizations of civil society in 
Turkey,‖ and I believe this obscures the institutionalization of certain horizontal 
relations within Turkish society which also contribute to Turkey‘s problematic 
democratization efforts.  I thus posit that vertical relations which sum up the strong 
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Chapter Four: Analysis of Late-Ottoman Reforms 
 This chapter provides an analysis of the late-Ottoman Empire, otherwise 
referred to as the reform period, when Western ideas and European powers began to 
critically affect the functioning of the Ottoman state.  Beginning in the first section 
with some historical context, the second section then discusses the structural changes 
that occurred in Ottoman society as a result, and describes the statist responses these 
structural pressures generated.  The third section then relates these developments to 
the problem highlighted in this paper, namely the lack of effective horizontal 
relations in Turkish society.  The analysis begins with an explanation of the 
Tanzimat reforms, focusing on how they further institutionalized the Ottoman millet 
system during a time of increasing tensions among different religious communities, 
especially between Muslims and non-Muslims.  Other significant reforms and 
policies, it is posited, compounded these attitudes which were in many respects not 
evident, at least not to such an extent, earlier in the Ottoman Empire.  The chapter 
thus refers to the Young Ottomans programme to institutionalize a single Turkish 
language, Sultan Abdülhamid‘s pan-Islamism, and the Young Turks/Kemalist‘s 
Turkism.  Taken together, the idea is put forward these policies have had a 
cumulative effect on the attitudes of majority-Sunni Muslim Turkish citizens toward 
minority groups in Turkey.  This chapter thus posits the idea that the policies 
enacted during the period in which the Ottoman Empire transitioned into the Turkish 
state institutionalized attitudes which persist to this day, and continue to inhibit 
Turkey‘s political liberalization, especially pertaining to the instigation, or lack 
thereof, of attitudes which would foster the civility required for reforms to contribute 
to political liberalization.  This chapter thus attempts to identify a historical legacy 
which contributes to the difficulty Turkey has in fostering normative horizontal 
relations in society. 
4 .1 Historical Overview of Transitional Period 
This section comprises a historical sketch of the transition from Ottoman 
Empire to Turkish nation-state, or republic.  The first reforms of the Ottoman state, 
influenced by European ideas, can be traced back to the Russo-Ottoman war of 
1768-74, along with Napoleon‘s invasion of Egypt in 1798.  Findley points out that 
these events were perceived by Ottoman elites as the menace of European 
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imperialism and ―stimulated demands in both Istanbul and the provinces ... for an 
end to the political decentralisation of the proceeding two centuries and a reassertion 
of Sultanic authority.‖148  The catalyst that was the menace of European imperialism 
was constituted by ―[a]dvanced technology, an economic system relying 
increasingly upon industry, [and] new techniques of government and of study 
culminating in military power.‖149  The first of the resulting reforms was thus 
military in nature.  This required more revenue and therefore more efficient 
government, and ushered in the first period of Ottoman reform.  Begun by Sultan 
Selim III (1789-1807) and continued by Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), it was a 
period in which European ideas first influenced Ottoman policy and a transition was 
begun from ‗tradition‘ towards ‗rational-legal‘ authority.150  Karpat states that the 
resulting centralization ―was instrumental in undermining the basis of the old 
arrangement and in paving the way for a new one.‖151  Such disruption of traditional 
arrangements was compounded by ―the destruction of the imperial army, the 
Janissaries, in 1826.‖152  This resulted not only in the introduction of the French 
regimental system to the military, but was also the catalyst for the curbing of 
religious power and regional rivalries. 
This first reform period fostered a general alignment of Ottoman and 
European interests and resulted in the Ottoman-British commercial treaty of 1838.  
This treaty gave to Great Britain ―undisputed competitive superiority with regard to 
domestic manufactures‖153 and facilitated the dependent integration of the Ottoman 
Empire into the world economy.  The introduction of what was essentially free trade 
on British terms caused the Ottoman state to almost collapse.
154
 It also marks the end 
of the first reform period.  In 1839, due to the admission of Western technological 
superiority, reformist tendencies were expanded with greater institutionalization of 
the reform processes already set in place, and marked the beginning of the second 
and more significant period of reform, the Tanzimat.  Coupled with the Ottoman-
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British commercial treaty, this period resulted in a condition of increased interaction 
with an emerging global modernity.   
The Tanzimat was thus a continuation of a governmental response to a period 
of crisis in which the Ottoman state began to contract.  For example, ―[i]n the 
Balkans, after Serbia won autonomy (1815) and Greece won independence (1830), 
separatist nationalism continued to spread.‖155  Concomitant with reform, territorial 
loss became the theme of the 19
th
 century.  Furthermore, due to economic collapse, 
the Ottoman state became financially dependent on European powers.  Responding 
to this period of crisis, ―reformist initiatives proliferated ... to a degree that defies 
summary,‖ although ―they cohere around certain themes.‖156  Significantly, the 
rationale for reforms was based on the belief that European ideas and technologies 
must be adopted if the Ottoman Empire was to compete in a period of social 
upheaval and war.  The entire reform process was thus a proactive response to 
European interference, and resulted in the adoption of the Ottoman constitution of 
1876-77. 
The constitutional foray of 1876-77 barely lasted two years, as the Russo-
Turkish war of 1877-78 created crisis conditions which allowed newly installed 
Sultan Abdülhamid to nominally end the first reformist period.  Fortna, however, 
points out that ―[r]ecent scholarship has credited Abdülhamid with continuing 
reforms that had only been partially realised in the Tanzimat era,‖157 and Karpat says 
his reign ―represents the synthesis of previous structural developments.‖158 More 
accurately, the Hamidian era ―represented an important shift away from a more 
hopeful and trusting attitude towards Western interaction with the Ottoman state.‖159  
Instead, it coupled modernization with Islam, and rejected the idea that its 
constitution should be guaranteed by European powers.   
Like the Tanzimat reforms and the Young Ottomans before him, 
Abdülhamid‘s strategy for countering secessionist tendencies and European 
interference did not succeed.  Ultimately, his plans were cut short by foreign 
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interference.  Fearing that the Sultan would allow Russia and Britain to carve up the 
Balkan‘s in their favor, the main opposition movement, the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) managed to force the Sultan to re-introduce the constitution, and 
ultimately cede all of his power.  The CUP initially attempted also to try and save 
the empire, but, due to massive geopolitical upheaval in the second decade of the 
twentieth century, generated a more nationalist perspective. 
The Hamidian period ended with the 1908 revolution.  Once again Western 
ideas began to dominate thinking about how to save the empire.  It was, however, 
conservative in nature; it was a continuation of what has been called the ‗defensive 
reform‘ movement begun by the Ottoman state with the Tanzimat.  Its essential task 
was not ―destruction and creative reconstruction, but rather ... conservation and 
survival of the Ottoman Empire.‖160  Accordingly, any liberal tendencies the CUP 
had before its ‗revolution‘ were discarded in favor of authoritarian strategies 
designed to ensure the survival of the empire.  This included the restriction of 
fundamental liberties. 
Following a period of contraction, after the Balkan Wars, and with the 
armistice of Mudros following World War I, the Ottoman polity found itself 
significantly more Turkish and more Muslim.  ―Mudros also marked the beginning 
of a struggle for survival under the new geo-political circumstances engendered by 
defeat in the First World War.  Galvanized by renewed occupation and the threat of 
mortal losses, the struggle lasted five years and further transformed state and society.  
When the Lausanne Peace Treaty of July 1923 restored the main lines of the Mudros 
ceasefire as new political boundaries, it consigned the Ottoman state to history and 
spawned the new state of Turkey, which was to be declared a republic in October 
1923.‖161  During this struggle for independence from the entente powers and to 
reclaim land lost during the war, imperial structures continued to operate and 
facilitated the independence movement‘s success.  However, the signing of the 
Lausanne Treaty by Mustafa Kemal‘s administration located in Ankara provided not 
only a new geo-political, but also international legal framework, which Kemal 
utilised as the basis for a new Turkish Republic.   
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4.2 Structural Changes in Ottoman Society and Statist Responses. 
This section builds upon the previous and identifies the structural changes in 
Ottoman society that accompanied the documented period of transformation.  It also 
outlines the state‘s (or state elite‘s) responses to these changes.  In particular it 
attempts to outline specific policies which can be identified as the legacy of 
contemporary problems in Turkish civil society, namely attitudes which continue to 
inhibit the flourishing of horizontal relations in Turkish society. 
With increasing interaction between the Ottoman Empire and European 
powers, structural transformations first began to occur along cultural-religious lines.  
These changes have both internal and external factors, but overall were a by-product 
of increased interaction with the West.  Conflict along these lines was nationalist, 
sectarian, and between religious and secular groups and was exacerbated by Western 
powers as they contributed to the politicization of religious differences between 
groups which had previously coexisted relatively peacefully.
162
  In the face of these 
changes, reforms were primarily a response to internal stimuli, culminating in the 
1876-77 constitution, which was a proactive response to internal change generated 
by external interactions.  These internal structural changes were the result of a 
transformation of patterns of regional exchange, whereby groups within the Ottoman 
Empire established more effective relationships with European powers than the 
Ottoman state,
163
 to the extent that ethnic minorities in the Ottoman Empire actively 
courted European powers.
164
  Such relationships, while also facilitating Western 
objectives, also reflected genuine economic insecurity on the part of non-Muslim 
groups.  The economic nature of the relationships between non-Muslim groups and 
European powers led to the emergence of new societal groups which placed novel 
demands on the Ottoman state.  These groups thus represented the emergence of a 
potential bourgeois class which, hitherto, had not existed in the Ottoman state.  Due 
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to the structural nature of the Ottoman authority system, the state was unable to 
change.  Instead, it implemented a modernization project on its own terms, which 
resulted in the codification of the already existing millet system.  The codification of 
the millet system contributed to tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, as it 
allowed their economic dealings to continue unhindered, while at the same time 
reducing the status of Muslims in society.  The inability to respond with structural 
innovation represented a diversion of interests between the Muslim elite and non-
Muslim groups, which led to more conflict as the state remained mired in a 
traditional conception of authority and continued to consider itself as synonymous 
with society.  Significant structural change would not occur until the upheaval 
represented by the First World War, which finally destroyed the fabric of Ottoman 
society. 
The establishment of effective relations with European powers by non-
Muslim Ottoman minorities led to political pressure being placed on the Ottoman 
state to guarantee their livelihoods.  The Tanzimat reforms were thus primarily 
designed to ward off European interference in the Ottoman state‘s internal affairs.  
Tanzimat reforms attempted to directly address the internal conditions which 
fostered a desire for European powers to interfere by engaging with the concept of 
citizenship.  The two primary documents associated with the Tanzimat (1839, 1856) 
―both declared equality of citizenship before the law, for Muslim and non-
Muslim.‖165  This policy was thus an attempt to placate non-Muslim communities 
and groups, as well as their patrons.   
However, this strategy was problematic.  ―With the Tanzimat reforms, the 
old system of differentiation and distinction and of Muslim legal superiority 
formally disappeared,‖166 which ―offended conservative Muslims who resented 
being deprived of the superior status that the şeriat assigned them.‖167  Additionally, 
the recognition of religion evident in the 1856 document ―in effect codified the 
confessional (millet) system of religious communities that has always been assumed 
to be fundamental to the Ottoman system,‖168 and thus exacerbated the structural 
changes which were already underway.  The codification of the confessional system 
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exacerbated changes in patterns of regional exchange.  In conjunction with the 
―financial colonization of the British and French,‖ it allowed considerable wealth to 
―[move] into the hands of the non-Muslim communities.‖169  This process set about 
impoverishing the Muslim elite
170
 at the expense of a non-Muslim commercial class, 
and meant that tensions between the two groups overrode the idea that all were equal 
citizens. 
The Euro-centric attitude of the Tanzimat reforms was critiqued by the 
Young Ottomans, who emerged from Tanzimat educational policy which was 
largely driven by the goal of elite formation.
171
  Their critiques were both 
substantive and procedural.  On the one hand, they criticized the absolute use of state 
power in implementing reforms.  On the other hand, they were unhappy with the 
granting of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims.  Their aim was ―to correct 
the errors of the Tanzimat reforms, and put an end to the cultural dichotomy which 
supposedly had resulted from a misunderstanding of the philosophical, ethical and 
social foundations of the empire, and from the use of state power to impose an alien 
cultural system on society.‖172   
―According to the Young Ottomans, the Tanzimat could not go 
beyond a cultural imitation and has shaken the Muslim community 
fundamentally ... the solution [instead lay] in the establishment of 
a representative, constitutional, and parliamentary administration 
and hence in the creation of a full loyalty in all subjects of the 
empire, Muslim or non-Muslim.‖173 
 
To avoid mere cultural imitation of Europe, the Young Ottomans counter-intuitively 
argued for the adoption of European institutions, instead of the adoption of European 
culture, and therefore played ―a vital role in introducing some general notions of pre-
modern political culture and in paving the way for the constitutional experiment of 
1876-77.‖174  ―They hoped that if the empire was furnished with more liberal 
institutions and if there was equality of citizenship before the laws for all subjects, 




 For evidence of this drawn from the Ottoman foreign service see C.V. Findley, "Economic Bases 
of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 28, no. 1 (1986). 
171
 Findley, "The Tanzimat." pp21-23. 
172
 Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908." p262. 
173
 Yelda Demirağ, "Pan-Ideologies in the Ottoman Empire against the West: From Pan-Ottomanism 
to Pan-Turkism," Milletlerarası münasebetler Türk yıllığı 36(2005). p146. Italics mine. 
174
 Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908." p266. 
43 | P a g e  
 
then it would be possible to save the country from collapse quickly and preserve its 
unity and integrity in the long run.‖175 
While the Tanzimat represents one of the first forays into Ottoman 
citizenship, the Young Ottomans were the first to ponder the notion of identity from 
a political perspective, that is, from a perspective concerning ―the political culture of 
the emerging ‗modern‘ Ottoman state.‖176  They ―began to seek a new identity to 
counter the nationalist feelings awakening in the Ottoman society which was 
previously organized under the ‗millet‘ system and believed they could only be 
successful against the nationalist current by a version of nationalism which would 
give everyone an overall identity.‖177  Their basic goal ―was the creation of a new 
identity for Ottoman subjects and loyalty to its government.  The new concept of 
Vatan (fatherland) aimed at creating a new form of identity to supersede religious, 
ethnic, and local divisions.‖178  Demirag refers to this identity as pan-Ottomanism; 
―a current of thought which aims at creating, over all the 
nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, a we-feeling of being 
Ottoman and an ‗Ottoman nation‘ in parallel with this feeling.  The 
main idea [of pan-Ottomanism] was a principle of ittihad-anasir-i 
(the unity of the components) taking each millet as an equal part of 
a greater Ottoman nation.‖179 
 
 The Young Ottomans‘ concern with the establishment of an Ottoman identity 
led them to a concern with the role of language in society, as it was symbolic of the 
Ottoman cultural dichotomy between rulers and ruled, whereby two types of Turkish 
were spoken, one by the bureaucracy and one by the ordinary people.  This problem 
was addressed by a group associated by the Young Ottomans, called the Young 
Pens, who believed that simplification was needed in order to permit communication 
with all the nation‘s people.‖180  The generation of a national language was argued to 
be essential for the Ottoman state to be able to aspire to the technological and 
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scientific levels evident in Europe, which ―depends upon the dissemination and 
spread of knowledge.‖181  In addition, the creation of a shared language was 
identified as a key strategy in overcoming the dichotomy of Ottoman society by 
bringing the elites and masses together in a sphere of communication.  Language 
was thus ―an essential condition for mass communication and national education.‖182  
Their upgrading of the language that ordinary people spoke ―was later used as a 
boundary setter in nation-state building to mobilize the masses around the Turkish 
national ideal‖, but at the time, ―their purpose ... was to maintain the unity of the 
Ottoman state...  The idea was that the new language would help to disseminate 
ideas to the common people.‖183  Education reform, begun with the Young 
Ottomans, would remain a theme of reforms up until the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, but coupled with its positivist goals would be the objective of 
assimilating ethnic and linguistic minorities into a common national identity. 
 The Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 marked the end of the Tanzimat and the 
activity of the Young Ottomans, and a new attempt at unity was put forward by 
Sultan Abdülhamid.  Following the war, one of Abdülhamid‘s objectives was 
―finding a means of achieving a sound and practical basis of social solidarity among 
the majority of his subjects‖184 and he ―saw the attractiveness of pursuing a policy of 
Islamic unity in the face of European encroachment... referred to as pan-
Islamism.‖185  Pan-Islamism reflected the idea that ―the main cause of the decline [of 
the empire] was the denial of the basic teachings of Islam.  It aimed to keep all 
Muslim people united politically, through giving them a sense of Islamic socio-
political identity.‖186  
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Because of the loss of territories that were a theme of this period, and the fact 
that these losses made the Empire a place increasingly populated by a majority of 
Muslims, it is during the Hamidian period that ―the idea of replacing Ottomanism 
with Muslimness began to gather strength,‖187 and Ottoman nationalism was 
gradually superseded by Turkish nationalism. ―The idea of a multinational state 
based on common citizenship lost its practical importance since the Ottoman state 
became predominantly inhabited by Muslims, and aside from Iran, it was the only 
remaining major independent Muslim state in the world.  The future seemed to lay 
[sic] in capitalising on the Muslim features of the empire in order to rally all the 
faithful, first, in order to assure the empire‘s survival, and secondly, to start the 
movement of Muslim liberation from European rule.‖188 
The reign of Abdülhamid was followed by a constitutional ‗revolution‘ and 
ushered in the second constitutional period.  The seeds of the 1908 revolution were 
sowed with Abdulhamid‘s program of education, which focused on combing 
secularist, scientistic components with Ottoman and Islamic traditions.  It thus 
exhibited rigidity and moral suspicion of liberality that ultimately served to foster 
frustration among students, a frustration which continued as young Muslims became 
part of a conservative bureaucracy:  ―Frustrated by the constraints of a conservative 
bureaucracy, and thinking more about the running sore of nationalist disaffections 
and insurrections and of European interference which these occasioned than about 
their Sultan‘s skill in managing the crisis, they sought a permanent remedy in the 
constitutional arrangements that, they believed, had allowed the West to progress 
and prosper.‖189  Furthermore, ―[t]hey believed that constitutional rule by elected 
representatives would solve all problems at one stroke.‖190  However, like 
Abdulhamid before them, the CUP developed a distaste for strong legislatures. 
The distaste of strong legislatures was especially due to a ―concern about the 
ability of a strong parliament to undermine the regime and aggravate ethno-religious 
conflict.‖191  The CUP thus continued down the constitutional path only so as to 
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bolster their authoritarian rule ―with the appearance of the sanction of the people.‖192  
As Hanioglu points out, ―[e]litism in the political thought of the [CUP] ... coexisted 
with an acute awareness of the symbolic value of the power of the people‖193, and it 
was within this context that ―[t]he first attempt to search for a Turkish identity for 
the citizens of the Empire in light of modern nationalist ideals appeared.‖194  The 
ideology of Turkism became the dominant discourse of citizenship in the Ottoman 
Empire during, and as a result of, the Balkan Wars.
195
  Demirag supports this 
position stating that ―[u]ntil the Balkan Wars, the policy of ‗Ittihad-i Anasir‘ (the 
unity of constituents) remained the dominant policy in terms of [the CUPs] main 
framework.‖196  ―The continuous attempts of Great Powers to intervene in the affairs 
of the Ottoman Empire under the disguise of protecting the minorities caused the 
young intellectuals to adopt Turkish nationalism vigorously.  However, while 
‗Turkish‘ proclivities emerged within CUP rule between 1908 and 1918, they took a 
back-seat to strategies designed to save the Ottoman Empire. 
Initially Turkish proclivities were subsumed within ideas like Ottomanism 
and pan-Islamism, only becoming more noticeable during the First World War with 
the possibility of the collapse of the empire.  Nationalism became a leading concern 
of intellectuals from all ethnic and religious backgrounds in the years leading up to 
the First World War, made visible by the proliferation of press publications 
following the revolution.
197
  Turkist nationalist tendencies, which didn‘t fit with its 
plans to save the multinational empire, entered the CUP through its press activities 
early on, but it was not until it became a pragmatic option to deal with the collapsing 
empire that it was fully articulated.  ―The young Turks introduced a new 
understanding that the nation was the source of all authority, and so they made the 
first attempt to transform the Empire into a model of a homogeneous state based on 
the premise of one state, one nation.‖198 
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The Turkist agenda was secularist with religion taking on a pragmatic 
function.  For Atatürk, Turkish nationalism was a means to self-determination.
199
  
Ironically it was this pragmatism which allowed for a resurgence of Islam in the 
form of a modernist movement, and an initial concordance between the CUP and 
Islamic leaders in the central regions of the empire.  ―But the underlying 
contradiction between the CUP leaders, who had a use for religion only insomuch as 
it legitimised their rule, and the modernists, for whom life under a revived Islam was 
the paramount goal, meant that relations were quickly strained.‖200  However, in 
spite of secularist tendencies, Westernization was opposed by the CUP and ―[a] 
backlash against all things Western set in after the Balkan Wars.‖201 
The general anti-Western, anti-Christian attitude that permeated the CUP 
leadership was at odds with the project of modernization.  Kemal Ataturk, however, 
noted the link between Westernization and modernization.  After successfully 
leading the Turkish military in the Turkish War of Independence against Western-
backed forces, he sought to disarm Western hostility so as to allow the 
modernization process to progress more smoothly.  By adopting a universal 
discourse concerning human civilization, ―Kemal directed the energy of the Turkish 
nationalism that he fostered away from external enemies and towards the domestic 
tasks of fighting backwardness and ignorance, and building up the prosperity of a 
ruined land.‖202  Kemal‘s perception of much of Turkey as ‗backwards‘ reflected his 
belief that European culture was the only path to modernity.  Accordingly, the 
reformist program attempted by the Kemalist elite focused on ‗civilizing‘ individuals 
who previously were allowed to maintain their particular identities.  This was done 
according to cultural objectives and attempted to create a shared national identity.  
Such a strategy had two components; destruction and creation.  On one hand, it 
required ―the total elimination of Ottoman and Islamic heritage, which was 
considered responsible for the backwardness of the state and society.‖203  Hanioglu 
argues that this aspect reflected the difficulty the existence of non-Muslim groups 
posed to purist Turk ambitions.  ―[T]he Turkists avoided confronting this reality, and 
instead chose to assault the very notion of an ‗Ottoman‘ identity as promoted by the 
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Tanzimat, which stood accused of robbing the Turks of their sense of self.‖204  This 
was because the Tanzimat accorded equal status to non-Muslims and Muslims which 
―prompted an uproar among the Muslims within the empire who felt that the ground 
beneath them was becoming increasingly more slippery and that they were losing 
their old privileged status.‖205  But it also reflected a belief that Islam itself was the 
cause of Ottoman backwardness.   
Once established, the Kemalists set about imparting a new Turkish identity, 
beginning with legislative provisions which continued the separation of religion 
from the political structure of the state begun with the abolition of the Sultanate in 
1922.  Furthermore, ―Kemal opposed ... the ideologies of Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-
Islamism and Pan-Turkism.  He [said] that Turks had deeds to do in Turkey, and 
adoption of any other policy would be nothing but adventure.  The new nationalism 
in the Republic of Turkey aimed at saving and developing the Anatolian Turks.‖206  
Such rhetoric was at odds with the concept of citizenship outlined in Article 88 of 
the Turkish constitution, which stated that ―the name Turk ... shall be understood to 
include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without distinction of, or reference to, 
race or religion.‖207  This definition was further complicated by the continuation of 
Islam as the official religion of the state.  
State practice deviated considerably from Article 88, especially as 
―[c]oncerns about the territorial and political unity of the country in the face of 
Kurdish rebellion and an Islamic uprising against secularism led the state to 
downplay [its] civic understanding of national identity and instead to emphasise 
homogeneity and ‗Turkishness.‘‖208  This response was the continuation of a 
response to the effects of World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, 
whereby ―outside Istanbul, the country was devastated, its population reduced and 
the fabric of its multi-ethnic and multi confessional society destroyed.‖209  An 
ideology of Turkish nationalism was thus deployed to fill the void.  Where before 
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Kemalist‘s, as Young Turks, had thought of themselves as Ottomans and Turks, 
now, with the loss of so many nations due to the war ―they settled for the single 
Turkish identity.  An ideology of Turkish nationalism, based on language, shared 
experience, genuine common interests and presumed common culture ... it tried to 
foster a Turkish national spirit, and pursued the goal of ‗national economy‘, a 
euphemism for discrimination not just against foreigners, but against non-Muslims 
also.‖210 
Strategies to achieve the secularization required for modernization attempted 
to destroy the link to the Ottoman past that Islam represented.  ―Perhaps the most 
important ... was inflicted with the adoption of the Latin script as part of reform 
attempts in 1928...‖211  On the other hand, a new identity had to be constructed as 
replacement.  This secular identity, as per Article 88, was not to be defined by 
ethnicity or religion, but was to be ‗constructed‘ and thus open to non-Turkish 
groups.  ―The Republican civilizing elite, therefore, tried its best to penetrate into the 
lifestyle, manners, behaviour and daily customs of the people, and to change the 
self-conception of Turks.‖212  Having inherited a strong centralized state apparatus, 
―the Republican state projected a particular form of a vision of socio-cultural life, a 
good life which each Turkish citizen should adopt ... [which] would represent a 
common good and national interest.‖213 
The emphasis on shared national identity, however, had significant 
ramifications for the way policy was put into practice, and state practice 
significantly deviated from the definition of Turkishness stated in Article 88.  
Ultimately, while attempting to destroy ethnic identification with groups which 
existed within the Ottoman Empire, Kemalist state practice identified Turkishness 
with ―membership in one of the Muslim Sunni ethnic groups closely associated with 
past Ottoman rule.‖214  Kadıoğlu refers to this process of ‗othering‘ identities in 
pursuit of a homogenous identity the ‗nationalisation of citizenship‘.  As well as an 
emphasis on being Muslim, the Turkish national identity ultimately emphasized 
language, and assimilatory campaigns were carried out which attempted to impose 
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the use of Turkish.  For example, the ‗citizen speak Turkish‘ campaign, a public 
campaign in which minorities were encouraged to speak Turkish, often with the 
collusion of elite groups within the minority.
215
  As well as national campaigns 
carried out in the public sphere, assimilation was attempted through ―Turkification 
measures in the realm of education and economics via newly adopted legal codes 
making Turkish classes mandatory in minority schools and making the use of the 
Turkish language mandatory in economic institutions.‖216  The focus on a national 
language was to the detriment of multicultural society, as the state used it as an 
ideological weapon in its modernization project.  ―[T]he new Turkish Republic 
standardized language and education in order to create and strengthen the Turkish 
national identity and modernize the country.  The foundation of the republic was 
characterized by a process of homogenization initiated by the state elite.‖217 
4.3 Transitional Reforms as a Legacy of Contemporary Civil Society  
The initial response to structural pressure was attempted during the 
Tanzimat.  The increasing agency of non-Muslim minorities and the fruitful 
relationships they established with European powers led the Ottoman state to 
implement reforms through citizenship policies.  Unable to accommodate structural 
change, however, the Tanzimat reforms discussed served to further systematize the 
millet system of governance, a structural reality which remained in place until the 
First World War destroyed the fabric of Ottoman society. 
The millet system was a mechanism which allowed the Ottoman state to 
indirectly rule different religious communities within the empire.  It was a loose set 
of central-local arrangements which allowed particular communities religious and 
regulatory autonomy while regulating transactions between them and the Muslim 
majority.  It was thus ―the simultaneous division and integration of communities into 
the state,‖ facilitated by the cooptation of local elites, ―intermediaries with a real 
stake in the maintenance of the status quo.‖218  When the millet system was further 
codified by the Tanzimat it was during a time of increased national tensions, and the 
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integration of these societal divisions became problematic.  Shaw points out that 
because of their association with European powers, ―many Muslims [began] to 
associate the minorities with foreign attack and even treason.‖  The influence that 
minorities exerted over the Ottoman state through their patrons left ―the Muslims 
feeling, with considerable justice, that the Tanzimat was, indeed, intended to place 
the minorities into a position of dominance in the empire and that it was singling out 
the non-Muslims for special treatment,‖219 
The second major response to structural pressures was attempted by the 
Young Ottomans, bureaucratic elites who emerged from Tanzimat education policies 
focused on elite formation.  The Young Ottomans attempted, not necessarily through 
official channels, to implement language reform in the hope of achieving a more 
comprehensive unity than that which the millet system could provide.  Language 
reform meant the establishment of a common language which would facilitate 
rationalist/positivist goals.  The Young Ottomans were thus the first group of Otto 
man elites to show an interest in language policies, which would continue to appeal 
to elites throughout Turkey‘s history. 
It was with the Young Ottomans that a focus on defining a common language 
emerged, and with the resulting decision to ‗upgrade‘ ordinary Turkish that we can 
witness the transition from a concern with Ottomanism to a concern with 
Turkishness.  The decision not to use Ottoman Turkish, and instead to use Turkish 
resulted in ―the interchangeable use of the terms ‗Turkism‘ and ‗Ottomanism‘... 
[which] provides an understanding of ... how the Ottoman nationalists moved toward 
the idea of creating a Turkish nation state and later advancing Kemalism.‖220  It is 
with the Young Ottomans that we first see the idea of language as an indicator of 
national identity, and it is thus here that the othering of non-Turks can be traced.  
The beginning of the establishment among Muslims of a shared language at this time 
would thus have exacerbated an in-group mentality vis-à-vis minority groups. 
The third significant attempt to counter changing structural conditions, 
especially as they began to be manifested as a result of military conflict, was Sultan 
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Abdülhamid‘s reactivation of Islamic identity which ―aimed to keep all Muslim 
people united politically, through giving them a sense of Islamic socio-political 
identity.‖221  Although later reforms were of a secular nature, as has been pointed 
out, Turkish secularism is about the control and reinterpretation of religion in 
society, and contemporary Turkish politics privileges Sunni Islam as a fundamental 
indicator of Turkish identity.  Thus it can be argued that the privileging of Sunni 
Islam in contemporary Turkish politics which is partly responsible for inhibiting 
effective democratic horizontal relations can be traced to the Islamic policies of 
Abdülhamid. 
Finally, the Turkism of the Young Turks and later Kemalists was discussed.  
Determining that they Ottoman state suffered from the backwardness of many of its 
citizens, which was a result of its Islamic past, they set about eliminating these 
aspects from collective memory.  Utilizing conceptions of modernity, the Kemalists 
thus set about homogenizing the population according to modernist principles, and 
concomitantly othering those who could not or would not subscribe to these new 
values.  The regime was thus secularist, but ideological pragmatism saw them 
establish a privileged relationship with Sunni Islam, with which a huge majority of 
citizens identified.  The complex relationship the state established with Sunni Islam 
is seen in its assault of the Tanzimat identity which was accused of robbing Muslims 
of their rightful place in society.  By assaulting this identity they were implicitly 
endorsing Sunni Islam as the religion of Ottomans and Turks, thus informally 
continued the Islamization of Ottoman/Turkish society begun by Abdülhamid.  This 
also built on the consequences of the Tanzimat reforms which codified the millet 
system by further generating differences between Muslims and non-Muslims.  The 
de-legitimization of the state‘s Ottoman heritage also contributed to the forging of 
inaccurate histories concerning the nature of the Ottoman millet system, obscuring 
the genuine cooperation and cohabitation it often entailed. 
As well as the elimination of the state‘s Ottoman heritage, its replacement 
with a new identity also fostered a lack of respect for non-Muslim/non-Turks by 
(Muslim) Turks.  A process of othering was concomitant with the nationalization of 
citizenship.  Isyar refers to this process as the ―the normalisation of the existence of 
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the Turkish race as a sovereign nation.‖222  He states that one of the most important 
acts of this normalization was the dismissal of a law that forbade ―the formation of 
political clubs and associations that had an ethnic base other than ‗Ottoman‘.  
However, this dismissal did not apply to all ethnicities and races in the empire but 
was solely for the Turks.‖223  This led to the formation of myriad groups and 
facilitated the construction of the racial culture of the Turks.  It was the 
institutionalization of Turkism and its claim to be the true mode of citizenship that 
invalidated Ottomanism.  The invalidation of which, it has been argued, is a central 
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Conclusion 
The framing of Turkey‘s Ottoman legacy in terms of its strong state tradition 
reflects the idea that the basic cleavage in Ottoman and Turkish societies has been 
between the center and periphery.
224
  While this is correct, it does not capture the 
whole picture.  Indeed, it may be required to look beyond strong-state analyses to 
inject new blood into Turkey‘s democratization process.  From the strong-state 
perspective, civil society is deficient.  Turkish society is inimical to civil society 
because of a Kemalist ideology which inhibits its potential to flourish.  This 
inhibition then results in a lack of effective pressure being placed on the state for 
significant liberalization.  Without this pressure, Kemalist ideology remains in place 
and unchanged, thus continuing the suppression of civil society.  Therefore, to 
escape the circular effect the strong state tradition has on Turkey‘s democratization 
process, an analysis that evades the strong state tradition by focusing on other 
aspects of the Ottoman legacy may be helpful. 
Overall, deficient horizontal relations are not only the result of Turkey‘s 
strong state tradition.  Since the reforms of the late-Ottoman period, we can see a 
number of policies and consequences that have contributed to a lack of trust and 
solidarity, notably between Turkish Muslims and minority groups, be they ethnic or 
religious.  The most significant of these policies were the Tanzimat reforms which 
further institutionalized divisions between non-Muslim minorities and Muslims at a 
time when their integration into Ottoman society was becoming problematic due to 
rising nationalist sentiments coupled with the relative impoverishment of Muslims.  
Further policies implemented between the Tanzimat and the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, while not as conclusive, exacerbated the divisions between non-
Muslim and Muslim, and contributed to a process of othering which this paper posits 
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